Aesthetic Theory and The Philosophy of Nature by Mikki, Said
Aesthetic Theory and The Philosophy of Nature
Said Mikki
E-mail: said.m.mikki@gmail.com
Abstract. We investigate the fundamental relationship between philosophical
aesthetics and the philosophy of nature, arguing for a position in which the latter
encompasses the former. Two traditions are set against each other, one is natural
aesthetics, whose covering philosophy is Idealism, and the other is the aesthetics
of nature, the position defended in this article, with the general program of
a comprehensive philosophy of nature as its covering theory. Our approach is
philosophical, operating within the framework of the ontology of the process of
the production of art, especially the views of Antonin Artaud, Heidegger, Bakhtin,
Deleuze, and Guattari. We interrogate Dilthey and Worringer while outlining an
ontology of art based on the production of nonhuman images and a nonpersonal
experiential field of nature.
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1. Introduction
Let us ponder the transition from Aristotle [1] on one side, to Artaud [2], Eisenstein
[3–6], Bakhtin [7–11], on another, and then back. The distance traversed in between
spans the vast majority of some of the best aesthetic theories available so far. First
of all, it is actually a full circle: Artaud [2] short-circuited Aristotle. How? Natural
aesthetics is the essence of Aristotle’s Poetics [1]. In effect, Artaud had called for
a return to nature where art is expressive of natural movements as such, i.e., a
disclosure or unconcealment of the fundamental dynamics of events and happenings
in the real world. In both Aristotle and Artaud, there is no mention of the
term ‘external world’; there is no “inner” or “outer,” because in Aristotle’s time,
the Ego-Subject pole had yet to be officially baptized by the seventeenth-century
Cartesian Book of Meditations [12]. However, with Artaud we encounter a full revolt
against the authoritarian strictures of Idealism and its new Gods, Man, Subject,
Ego-consciousness, the Signifier.1 Therefore, if it is possible to associate ‘natural
aesthetics’ with Aristotle, and ‘aesthetics of nature’ with Artaud, then the natural
question to ask here is that about the real philosophical difference between the two
views of aesthetic theory. Explicating an answer to this question is the main subject
of this article.
An Aristotelian theory of art as imitation ignores the human individual (artist
or receiver) and directs attention to the natural object imitated, even if the latter is
1A. Artaud, To Have Done With the Judgement of God, 1947 [2].
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part of human phenomena like society and social relations. The main thrust here is
clear: What is sublime lies in the natural world, and so all art is our poor attempt to
repeat the magisterial in the “objective” natural world. Even the laws of art, forms of
play and composition, are worked out by Aristotle in a way strongly resembling his
famous approach to nature, especially the biological world: classification of cases and
collected samples; logic and retrospective analysis; abduction of the rules of nature by
observation and reflection. Consequently, we find ourselves forced to treat the Greek
approach as natural, and label its aesthetic theory as natural aesthetics.
On the other side of time, throughout the “low and dishonest decade”2 of the
1930s, Antonin Artaud had stood up to the prevailing order and composed his great
For the Theatre and its Double [2], where he boldly announced that the goal of theatre
(or art in general) is not enforcing opinions expressed by words (ideology), but the
living again of the real as corporeal, that is, nature in its true formal manifestation:
Bodies in interaction with each others. The emphasis on the physicality of the
flesh is part of the new program’s desire to redirect art toward its home abode:
Nature. According to Artaud, performance on the stage must avoid the intentional
broadcasting of ready-made ideas and propaganda lines, moving instead toward the
reenactment of natural processes by the production of incorporeal expressions while
playing and manipulating purely corporeal elements. And that is why we can call such
approach to the philosophy of art the aesthetics of nature.
Similarly, and independently of Artaud, who worked completely alone, other
thinkers had advanced complex and radical theories of the aesthetics of nature, most
prominently Mikhail Bakhtin [7–11], Sergei Eisenstein [3–6], Nietzsche [14–19], and
Fernando Pessoa [20]. A detailed engagement with their corresponding thinking
about the connection between art and nature will be taken up by the author in
future publications.3 We add here that in spite of the extreme diversity of the
technical contents of their philosophies of art, they all share with Artaud a common
characteristic, which is the attempt to demonstrate that the artistic process is not a
commentary by humans on nature, but is the living through of the natural process
as such, where “living” does not signify “lived experience,” but the re-actualization of
the virtual by opening up to outside fluxes and lines of flights and possibilities. Felix
Guattari, an avid reader of both Artaud and Bakhtin, captured this spirit extremely
well in some of his best books [25,26].
For our immediate purposes in this article, we focus on Artaud as a representative
of the aesthetics of nature. Aristotle’s view is treated as the inceptual point of
Aesthetics. The main proponents of natural aesthetics are the group of philosophers
and artists associated with Idealism. We interrogate the idealistic position through a
dialogue with Dilthey and Worringer, two key transitional figure from the modernism
of the nineteenth century to the postmodernism of the twentieth century. We propose
an ontology for art based on the concept of nonhuman experiential field in nature,
which is connected with another idea, that of the nonpersonalistic image. The
ontological model is proposed and developed in parallel with a critical reexamination
of the conventional approach within Idealism.
2Auden’s poem September 1, 1939 [13].
3There is already a significant secondary literature covering various other aspects of their
philosophies of art, e.g., see [21–24].
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2. Schiller’s Law
It appears to us that art and nature are essentially related to each other, though not
in the peculiar way found in German Idealism. Let us recall Dilthey’s expression of
what he called Schiller law :
I shall designate by Schiller’s law the thesis that the aesthetic process can
either discern a liveliness of feeling in outer form and thus enliven what is
visible, or make life visible in outer form and thus give life form. This law
thus involves the constant translation of lived experience into form and form
into lived experience.4
Schiller’s law presents the nucleus of post-Aristotelian aesthetic theory. This theory
does not consider the classic Aristotelian text Poetics [1] as the principal bible for
the post-Cartesian aesthetic era. In fact, both Spanish and English dramatists viewed
Greek tragedy as a bad model for expressing the needs of the new bourgeoisie world
with its commercialism and anti-religious sensibilities. Regardless to the fact that both
Goethe and Schiller were delighted by discovering the eventual agreement between
their own aesthetic theories and Aristotle’s, the fact remains that the theoretical
formulation of the problem as compactly represented by the Diltheyian Schiller’s law
above is a complete departure from the Aristotelian style of thinking. The German
theory takes it for granted that form is by default dead. Form is the “soul” of nature,
but nature is defined – following idealism – as that which is not human, i.e., the
external or outer world per se. Everything that is not “me” or “us” belongs to the
natural order of beings. It follows then that form – conceived here on the model of
geometric (Euclidean) figures – is necessarily passive and static. On the other hand,
life belongs to “us” human beings, and therefore to everything that is inner or internal.
The dialectic of life and nature, the inner and the outer, makes its appearance here,
and Hegel [28] – following earlier formulations by Schilling [29] and the Schlegels [30] –
will take this “dynamic duality” into the most extreme level reached by pre-Husserlian
Kantianism, that of the logic of the Absolute [31].
Schiller’s law states that the essence of art resides in bringing this inner feature
of dynamic life (the Lifeforce) into the “dead externalism” of form: Art consists of
merging the lively found within experience with the formal dryness of the outside.
It is not difficult to see then that – according to this new formulation– that which
lies within is to be taken as the privileged pole: The human subject is conceived
here as the ultimate goal of the art process (idealism, Romanticism, phenomenology,
existentialism, etc). Nature would acquire an aesthetic significance only by manifesting
herself to the observer as an external totality infused with the human value of becoming
a life for us.
The key term ‘visibility’ enjoys a prominent position in the German aesthetic
theories of Goethe, Schiller, the Schlegels, Hegel, and others [30], indicating how seeing,
that central organ of Kantianism, is still the fundamental ontological process. Art is
here understood as an apparatus or process capable of altering the mode of visibility
of “dead objects” by transforming them into carriers of human values. Within the
overall theoretical program of Idealism, we may view the creation of artwork as the
alteration of perspectives, a change in the device we employ to evaluate entities and
things. A sculpture transforms into an artwork by investing its passive matter with
aesthetic value. A perfect analogy with the new economic order of mechanized mass
4Dilthey [27], page 45.
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production in the emerging global industrialism of the late nineteenth century [32], for
Marx would theorize that production transfers labour value to the “dead object” and
hence enlivening it – making it a commodity [33, 34]. Similarly, in idealism, artworks
and commodities are products of the assembly lines of modern time: Life is injected
into dead matter by skilled craft, a metamorphosis of the dead into vibrancy and
livelihood.
But if nature and life are one and the same, then Schiller’s law becomes an
immediate triviality. What is the point of art if it strives to reaffirm the known and
obvious? It is for this reason that the philosophy of nature cannot accept the pre-
Artuad, pre-Nietzsche contribution to aesthetic theory as final. The failure of German
Idealism in this regard can be approached from two different but related perspectives.
First, the ontological perspective where knowledge of the identity of form and life
leads us to question the originality of Schiller’s law. The second perceptive is political
and relates to the Marxian analysis of the way in which idealism had flirted with art
in order to integrate the production of artworks with the firmly established capitalist
regime, subsuming the “spiritual” inner life of the individual as manifested through
artistic expression to the material laws of the economy, and ending up by enforcing
culture therefore to become a determined or dominated superstrata in society.
It should be noted here that the Marxian perspective is not necessarily Marxist,
and that in the philosophy of nature what should be understood by technical terms like
matter and form is very different from the Hegelian concepts so prevalent in Orthodox
Marxism, e.g., Lukacs [35], Adorno [36, 37], and Marcuse [38]. By allying itself
with Hegel’s Logic [31], Marxism relapsed into Kantianism and missed a fundamental
insight brought by Marx’s work: the critique of both idealism and capitalism in one
and the same book, Capital [39, 40].
The need to search for organic connections between art and nature is not a retreat
into inhuman modes of expressions. What is nonhuman is not necessarily inhumane.
The new aesthetics of nature is neither pro-Rousseau nor anti-Rousseau, and the
model after the poet-as-Goethe and his characteristic relation to nature is not really
a direct concern for us here. By declaring Schiller’s law a triviality, the intention is to
reorient art toward the nexus of natural events as singularities impregnated in the real
world and generating the flux of experience, the very inner flesh of Nature’s lifeworld
itself. The concepts of living and lived experience have been initially developed by
the introspective techniques inaugurated by Augustine then rediscovered by Descartes
and Fichte, always focusing on the interior of the person, the selfworld. Here, it is the
human psyche as a model, a universe populated by thousands of small little shattered
selves, each associated with desires and pleasures, connecting instinctive drives with
culturally-acquired habits and social motifs, all marching with Reason in unison.
3. The Nonhuman Experiential Field of Nature
The sum total of all these atomic happenings taking place in the depths of the self
– eruptions of the soul and the waning of will, the adumbration of feeling tones and
harmony, dark intimate moments of visions – all such inner inflections have been
baptized, in the hands of past thinkers and artists, by the generic term ‘experience.’
Idealism, then, reemerges into the scene, again. The concept of experience is strongly
entangled with ideology, no doubt, for how do we know that the selfworld is the
ultimate locus of experience? Isn’t this, again, an ego-centred attitude motivated by
the inherited techniques of self-introspection? The meaning of the self is not disclosed
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by experience: It is the self that is generated from within a nonpersonal experience in
nature, manifested as a field of affects; empirical persons are simply “objects” tapped
into this universal field. Nature is too rich and broad a concept to be exhausted by
reductionism or atomism, but experience is one of its fundamental modes of existence.
Even though we find it utterly impossible to define nature using “pschyological” terms,
it is not too much oversimplification to state that nature becomes through experience;
or, in other words, one may say that there has been a world since, from the beginning,
there was something like an experiential field of Nature (before even the emergence
of consciousness.) The various physiological and mechanical effects preserved inside
the enclosing bio-surface of the organism and forming the biological self are in direct
communication and interaction with this global field [41]. Self excitations in the
experiential field lead to the genesis of the ego, the self, the person, and so on,
but overall there remains a deeper significance than that, for the enlivening of the
self through experience generates values, signs, meaning-wholes, hence giving rise
to connective semiotic networks radiating away from the enclosing surface of the
individual [42].
Within the cosmic program of the philosophy of nature, we define art as the
enactment of a phenomenological description of this experiential field. As such, art
naturally first strives for communication. To accomplish that, it gets entangled
right from the beginning with the reproduction of meaningful blocks of signs and
symbols. This is why there is no art without a theory of meaning, and no
meaning in independence of a metaphysics of nonpersonal experience. During the
technical process of the production of the artwork, Nature recedes to the background,
functioning only in a metaphorical manner, while the real process of living through
experience is left for the private imagination and the creative virtuosity of the artist
as a finite self. Therefore, a tension inevitably arises between the self-pole and the
nonpersonal experiential field during the process of recording lived experiences by the
ego-consciousness and the subsequent production of meaning antecedent to forming
the artwork. There appears to be a conflict in nature between the personal self and
the nonpersonal field, but the entire difficulty of artistic creation hinges on devising
stable methods capable of generating a temporary resolution in terms of signs emitted
from the individual through the work of art.
How does the artist approach experience then? Not introspectively, like the comic
figure of a person “psychoanalyzing” his own self in order to seize on fruitful materials
for productive work; and there is certainly no comparison here with the solemn
vocation administered by Aristotelianism centered on imitation, which nowadays are
resurfacing in the various aesthetic theories of mimesis [43]. Experience is approached
artistically only through the medium of imagination, that is the process of production
of lived images. Once an image is produced, it enters into the surrounding nonpersonal
experiential field of Nature and stays there. An image is to be sharply contrasted with
the idealistic concept of fantasy5 by the fact that the former is objective and real while
the latter is subjective (but still real.) Fantasy can be induced by drugs or ideology,
while images require a concentrated mental effort akin to creation. Average men and
women engage with pre-fabricated images distributed into society through the agencies
of mass culture and media [46,47]. A “propaganda engineer” is a person responsible of
designing and building various types of images for wide circulation and consumption
5Though sometimes both image and fantasy can be studied by similar phenomenological methods
[44]. Deleuze approahed the relation between image and phantasm using poststructuralist, hence non-
phenomenological, methods [45].
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under the hegemony of the dominant ideological field, and it is such kind of artificially
created images that is usually used up by typical persons [48, 49]. Artists, on the
other hand, possess a rich psychological constitution and enough intellectual facility
to create their own internal images. But while those images are created privately, art
re-injects them into the existing social and cultural fields, ensuring that the interior
(self) is safely connected with the exterior (world) through a semantically functioning
circuit of exchange. Here, communication emanates from the self-pole of the creative
person toward nonpersonal experiential fields, not necessarily in the direction of other
persons. True art transcends the ideological field by striving to connect with the
ubiquitous field of natural experience, cutting through the existing web of power
relations dictated by the dominant ideology. This is why artistic imagination is fully
objective when it gives birth to images belonging to the nonpersonal world of nature,
while fantasy is in comparison a local subjective phenomenon occurring only within
the ego-consciousness of private individuals consuming pre-made iconic and symbolic
imageries handed down to them from media and mass culture institutions.
Artistic creation is the production of new images embodied in a material
form. Therefore, the antecedent stage involving the artist’s pure phenomenological
description of lived expedience is not by itself sufficient for completing the task. After
generating an internal image, the result must be translated into a communicable form,
and this in turn requires molding the imageries thus attained into a concrete material
shape: music, sculpture, painting, performed act, literary text, and so on. An artwork
is always a concrete object laden with meaning, waiting to be transmitted, in one way
or another, to some potential audience, we don’t know exactly who, but the absolute
ability to achieve the successful transfer of a signifying essence to other receivers is
fundamental, even if this receiver happens to be one and only one individual: the artist
himself. Art and communicability are therefore indissolubly linked, and Bakhtin was
profoundly right when he theorized about the fundamental notion of the answerability
of the work of art and its various ontological dimensions [11].
We must, however, be careful to avoid any subjective bias at this point. When
we talk about the internal image, this is not to be understood as a “representation”
generated in the interior world of the artist’s psyche. The latter is certainly involved,
at least on the empirical side of the process, but from the ontological (fundamental
and applied) perspective, an internal image is as objective and real as an “external”
image, both being one and the same matter but expressed differently in the two
situations; in one case the image is presented to the self-pole through materials
largely derived from sensations and sense impressions, the basic building blocks of the
psychic lifeworld (selfworld). In the other case, the internal image is converted into a
material representation using physical or linguistic signs or other means. The formal
essence of the image is generated only once (in the artist’s imagination), but once
released, it can live independent lives in unlimited number of material expressions.
An image is essentially indestructible. This explains the apparent paradox about
the contradiction between the concrete material realization of the completed artwork
and the universality of the formal essence of any artistic creation. The resolution
can be found once we realize that the so-called “completed artwork” is in reality
one material expression among infinitely possible others. The artwork is a physical
or semiotic material realization of an image that happened to be generated initially
inside the artist’s imagination, the image itself becoming – once created – an eternal
object joining the inhabitants of the experiential field of nature. Therefore, a singular
artwork remains laden with “universal essence” though not in the sense of idealism or
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Kantianism, but rather in the specifically ontological way we prefer to deploy in the
philosophy of nature.
The underlying matter of the artwork is the image. In nature’s experiential field,
the image is permanent. This eternal object may be manifested in myriad expressive
forms depending on the context of the social fields in the “vicinity” of the image. The
same image may be expressed in music, poetry, drama, painting, etc, but if new art
media are invented, it is still possible to express the very same image in the new
language of form. In other words, to make an image concretely embodied in the
artwork is merely a technical problem. Sometimes a profound image can be expressed
in one medium only, like music, where afterwards it becomes hard to find a proper
material expression in other languages.
4. Image vs. Impression: A Critique of Idealist Aesthetic Theories
An image, as understood in the aesthetics of nature, is not to be confused with the
psychological concept created by the British empiricists Locke, Hume, Berkeley, and
their continuation in the German schools of Kant, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, Lessing,
Schlegel, Wundt, and Dilthey. In all such quarters, one finds the newly founded domain
of aesthetics constantly conflated with the systematic study of psychic impressions and
feeling-tones defined personalistically and approached using language and methods
derived from perception and introspection. The proclamation of the scientificity
of the emerging discipline was certainly among the main factors responsible of the
psychological approach to the topic of art reception, which was equated, at least since
Kant, with “sensation.” To sense the beautiful in an artwork is therefore a special kind
of feeling to be “rigourously” distinguished from other forms of impressions crowding
the inner sphere of the person. Now, while it is true that art is an exclusively “human”
domain of creativity, the ego-pole serves only as a point of departure (creation) and
a spot for termination (reception) of artworks without the need to restrict the actual
process of communication to the psychic level. In other words, the person is contingent
on putting the internally generated image in a form amenable to understanding within
existing social and cultural fields.
But in the philosophy of nature the image itself, its laws of formation and
production, its manner of communicability and exchange, its mode of movement
and transfer, and finally its ability to interact with other ego-poles, all such natural
modulations of the functional role, are not psychological but in fact ontological.
Starting with Kant [50], German Idealism had attempted to steer aesthetics away
from the “metaphysical” Leibniz by proclaiming the study of art as a scientific and
systematic endeavour to be carried out with utmost care and using the most rigorous
methods [28]. This counterattack by Kantianism relied on a self-conscious deployment
of various readily available Cartesian methodological apparatuses exploited in order
to undermine the essential advance made by Leibniz [51] over Descartes in this area
of research. Everywhere, and up to the present day, the idealistic approach to art
continues to concentrate on how a person perceives the sings emitted by the artwork,
whether within a context of interpretation (hermeneutics [52]) or sensation (scientific
aesthetics [53]), where in any case the outcome is a reduction of the art problem to the
personal sphere of human players within a social field. Even Western Marxism [54,55],
with its characteristic concern for the literary and the beautiful, have not been able to
fully appreciate the ontological irrelevance of the human dimension in the process of
artistic creation and communication. It is mainly starting with Nietzsche [14,18,56,57]
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and Artaud [2] that the heavy hand of the doctrine of ego-consciousness (Cartesianism,
Kantianism, Hegelianism, Romanticism, orthodox Marxism, Neo-Kantianism, etc.)
began to loosen their grip on the mainstream ideology of aesthetics within the tradition
of idealism, virtually the only direction of investigation open to inquiry in the academic
wold up to that point.
Within the parameters of the world-historical reformulation of Idealism espoused
by Dilthey, he defined the scope of “rational aesthetics,” or the scientific approach to
art, in the following essentially complete description:
Rationalist aesthetics conceives of beauty as a manifestation of the logical in
the sensuous and of art as a visible presentation of the harmonious nexus
of the world. In his sensuous intuition, the artist obtains an obscure but
intensely felt awareness of this nexus. As there is but a single world-
nexus, the sensuous relationships that exist within it must ultimately be
formulated in one principle. Natural beauty and artistic beauty express this
nexus in their respective languages. Even the most spontaneous expression
of imagination is subject to rules. Such rules are found in harmonics and
metrics; they are operative in the flow of a line, in the formation of a figure,
and in the ornamentation produced by the architect and the artist. The taste
of a poet is developed as an embodiment of such rules. Unity of action and
precepts deriving from it govern drama. And all these rules are grounded
ultimately in the rational order of the universe.6
Here we find the infamous presupposed isomorphism between the world and the
mind. The “logical,” therefore, expressed in and through the “sensuous.” Within this
framework, aesthetics is essentially the study of the laws governing the production
and combination of sensations. Harmony in sensations and the rational order of the
universe are unified in one and the same intellectual and artistic discourse. Idealism
sees the essence of the cosmos reflected in the person contemplating nature.
Although Kantians revere natural beauty, including the pre-Kant Rousseau and
the post-Kant Goethe, expending great effort to expound the uniqueness of the
position of the physical and living worlds with respect to the observer, in Idealism
it is ultimately the human factor, or – philosophically – the perceiving subject, to
whom the entire process of nature is referred to. Natural beauty is equated with
artistic beauty and hence the return to a modern interpretation of Aristotle in terms
of the Cartesian subject, the latter is now viewed as “imitating” the universal ideal
of reason as manifested in the natural world. The cosmos is ordered according to
the mental a priori conceptions of our mind. If there is a beauty “out there,” it
is because the internal image thus generated in the perception of the natural entity
reflects the harmonious relations put into the very same “object” itself created after the
entity through the act of perception (the transcendental reduction.) In Kantianism,
the movement from “something unknown” (the entity, or Object X) to the “perceived
something” (object) exhausts experience. Experience here becomes lived experience,
while any nonpersonal experience is rejected as a relic of the pre-scientific metaphysics
of the ancients, including even modernizers like Leibniz and Spinoza. The new
aesthetics is an unashamed, fully-fledged Cartesianism: the study of art is reduced
to the search for “rules” and “natural laws” governing the dynamics of the “sensations
of the heart” according to the dicta of Universal Reason.
6Dilthey [27], page 187.
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There is then a double reduction at the heart of idealist aesthetic theory. First,
a reduction of the matter of the beautiful into ultimate sensations in the human
subject forming the basic building blocks of the aesthetic lived experience. Second, a
reduction of these sensuous “aesthetic atoms discoursing on the world” into the rational
disciplining of the perceived by positing strict universal rules and laws behaving
according to the dicta of Reason and the Beautiful Soul. The Beautiful is that in
nature which is discerned by Taste. In Kantianism, Nature is subjugated to Taste [50].
5. Interlude: Goethe and the Process of Nature
An admirer of Kant and a self-proclaimed “idealist” like Goethe, however, proceeded
differently. With this world genius, we don’t meet the obligatory incentives of
Kantian aesthetics and its authoritarian prescriptive rules of discourse, but rather
the creative process itself, which, in Goethe’s case, is exclusively reduced to the
embodiment of the collective mind or unconscious in the contingent body and person
of the artist-genius, hence directing the real focus of inquiry. Art is not about
sensations or pleasure, whether being interested or disinterested. Art has nothing
to do with subjective feelings, and perception is always secondary, relegated to the
merely biographical. Instead, nature and art become one in the process of production:
The production of images (art), the production of concepts (science), the production of
ideas (philosophy), the production of objects (perception), the production of organisms
(ontogenesis), the production of desire (psychogenesis), and so on. The natural
process and the artistic process are not two parallel developments, one belonging
to a contemplating human mind and the other to a dead, passive “nature.” Rather it
is the other way around: feelings and aesthetic pleasures and lived memories are
the redundant and secondary part of the entire story: It is nature that is alive
and productive, while the human pole and its correlate, the ego-consciousness, are
tapped into the cosmic process of becoming we find in the Whiteheadian concept of
nature [58,59].
In fact, Bakhtin had already noted that this cosmic concept of nature was fully
developed in Goethe [10].7 In a beautiful passage, Dilthey summarized this Spinozist
worldview of Goethe in the following manner:
.. Goethe’s poetic imagination unlocked the mystery of nature and art.
Because Goethe’s efforts to intuit nature were akin to the process of artistic
productivity, his experience of the creative power of his own imagination
was at the same time a disclosure of the power of nature itself. He
regarded nature as a purposive power, governed by laws, which express
itself in metamorphosis, intensification, an architectonic of typical forms,
and the harmony of the whole. Consequently, art was for him the highest
manifestation of the workings of nature.8
Therefore, the scientific study of nature through postmodern mathematics and artistic
creation are not set in opposition to each other, but act more or less like two
complementary aspects of a single intellectual endeavour aspiring to achieve a profound
understanding of nature and life. This is not a return to English Romanticism or
early nineteenth-century German thinking. We are fully aware of the deep difficulties
7Bakhtin’s book-length manuscript on Goethe was destroyed by a German raid during World War
II. Luckily for us, a very dense and substantial fragment survived, published in the collection [10].
8Dilthey [27], page 250.
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inherent in any non-empirical approach to nature and to the problematic aspects
of Naturphilosophie, especially its inevitable entanglement with Cartesianism in one
way or another. There is also no royal way back to the Greeks as envisioned by
Wagner [60], dreamed by Nietzsche [14], and indefatigably analyzed by Heidegger (in
almost all of his books.) The most effective path remaining open to the philosopher,
we believe, is the one chosen by Artaud: To be both the theorist/aesthetician and the
artist: reflecting on art by first creating new art forms then constructing an original
aesthetic theory not by way of commentary and amassing observations and notes,
but by working directly at the ontological level of the metaphysics of the nature-art
complex.
6. Nature and Art, Bodies and Schizophrenia: Sweet Artaud
In order to see, hear, and feel an artistic experience, theories about “the rational
depiction of nature” or the bourgeoisie disinterested pleasure must be bracketed out
and suspended [25, 61–63]. In fact, it is schizophrenia as a productive field – in both
the political and artistic sense – what counts most when it comes to experiencing and
recording new modes of creativity within modern culture [64–66]. Dilthey’s account
of the poetic experience [27] remains tainted by idealism, whose machinations he was
unable to break free from, even until the end of his intellectual career, in spite of the
fact that Kantian standard aesthetics was not the major focal point in the oeuvre of
this otherwise remarkable writer.
Let us start by asking the following question: Why should “joy” be ascribed to the
art vocation? When the Enlightenment turned toward the aesthetic experience [30],
everything was planned within a large-scale production scheme intended to supply the
crowds with mass entertainment [32, 46]. Although this task was already present in
the Greek world, where tragedy, inseparable of its theatrical public staging, served
as one of the fundamental communication channels connecting intellectuals with
the “people” [67], the modern period has been consistently undermining the true
relationship between the art experience as creative production on one side, and its
corresponding consumption by the receiver. We are currently entering into these
strange times where everything on the stage is premeditated and pre-orchestrated
by meticulous calculations performed by the “creative art director” (the modern art
“executive”), whose sole purpose in many cases appears to be addressing the crude and
vulgar instincts of art mass consumers [48,68]. Within this overall political framework,
genuine interest in what really takes place inside the productive genius’ mind would
naturally decline, shifting into neighboring disciplines like psychology or sociology.
If art is all about the production of singular images nowhere to be found in mass
culture, then the “state of mind” of the actual producer in this supreme process will
itself become an essential ingredient of the created image as such.
This is why when reading the private papers of great artists and thinkers, we
just can’t help but assume that the writing process itself was part of an overall plan
or mission pursued unconsciously by a collective (nonpersonal) mind irreducible to
the concrete empirical ego of the artist in question. In a letter addressed to his
doctor, Artaud described his personal feeling-tones using the following extraordinary
sentences:
Something which has almost disappeared from the field of my observation
and which no longer characterizes my condition is the impression of incredible
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fatigue, of total exhaustion, an exhaustion which seems to undermine the
resistance, the muscular coordination of the organism on all levels and in
all senses. And this sensation of monstrous, horrible fatigue, this vast,
extraordinary pressure on the top of the skull and the back of the neck,
a pressure whose force and whose volume, seemingly, is so great that it feels
like a weight of the world on one’s shoulders, is accompanied by one knows
not what cosmic emotion, is combined with the tactile sensitivity, the vast
feel of interstellar space, and the proof of this is that when I am lying in
bed the sensation, far from disappearing, grows worse, is transformed into
an impression of painful emptiness, operating magnetically, which presses
on the limbs and the whole length of the spinal column and surrounds the
pelvis.9
Everything is described with a strict photographic prose that is both rosy and at the
same time mechanical, anatomical, and scholarly, the masterful blending of the ugly
with the lively being one of the key features of the Artaud Universe.
There is no “beautiful soul” to be found here [61]. Like Nietzsche before and
the subsequent Deleuze, the grandiose “duty of the genius” as a “responsible” figure
in modern capitalist society striving to establish a balance between industrialism on
one side, while keeping aflame the spiritual secular sphere of the post-medieval order
on the other side, is ridiculed and rejected by the art theorist. We are not dwelling
in the interior introspective world of the subjective artist exploring his ego (young
Joyce), but rather living up the crushing, suffocating, and intolerable birth of an
image ejected into the world with unbearable pain and agony. Pain is an element of
desire. Nonpersonal desire is the transcendental field of creative art production. It
was Nietzsche [19] who first came up with this formula and Artaud rediscovered it
by undergoing a process of becoming-schizo just after Jung himself had gone into the
same metamorphosis [69–71].
Nature herself is at work in the body of Artaud’s mind where the mental becomes
pure primary matter: an infinite concentration of sheer productive virtuality. The
inextricable link between pain and productivity has only a passing resemblance to
the classical agony of the great artist meticulously described by idealist aestheticians
and art historians. There is nothing sublime or otherworldly or magisterial about the
forehead of the master or his divine eyes; only flows of shit, urine, blood, flesh, sperm,
clay, mud, lava, are what populate the schizo’s cosmos [64]: it is neither pitiful nor
ironic nor even humorous, but absolute de-composition and dis-connection; neither
decay nor dissolution, but, like the Heidegger machine, an ontological construction
that must first be proceeded by destruction [72,73], and what has been dis-connected
may be re-wired again in the future [74].
The above graphic Artaudian clinical depiction of the aesthetic experience is
followed by a sobering description of the hardcore of the creative process as such, that
concerning the eruption of nonhuman images:
When I am in these states, a number of unconscious images persist, they
themselves are not sick, but the malady seems to manifest itself the moment
an image becomes conscious, however slightly, the moment it is invested with
sensibility, emotion, will. As soon as the slightest suggestion of an intellectual
desire appears to help some image or idea take a body by taking a form, as
soon as one tries to pronounce in a clear and lucid manner any one of those
9Artaud [2], page 291.
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unspoken words which the mind associates endlessly, the disease manifest
its presence, its continuity; it is as if the mind needs only decide to enjoy
an internal idea or image for this enjoyment to be taken away from it: the
spoken image regularly miscarries, and to try to bring this idea or image into
the world is even more difficult, and only serves to reveal more flagrantly
and more rapidly the lack of continuity, the lack of nervous density which is
fundamental to my present personality.10
Theoretical psychology, clinical psychology, aesthetics, physiology, ontology, literature,
all mixed together and integrated within the singular aspect of viewing and “seeing” the
image produced in the interior space of the artist. Sickness comes from consciousness,
the moment an unconsciouns image becomes “sensible” (Artaud’s Law.) Schizos are
not always miserable sick people, even when their pain and howling are intolerable, for
they signify a state of tension in nature that has reached a limit point following long
periods of accumulating exploding materials unconsciously transmitted throughout
thousands of years [75–77], inevitably leading to the violent opening up we witness
in those crushed persons now fatally experimenting with the bleak destiny of their
fractured being [78].
Do we have to reject Artaud the thinker by projecting Artaud the individual as a
“patient,” a mere philosophical “case study,” a representative sample of the prototypical
“depressive maniac” popular in post-World War I modernism and post-World War
II postmodernism? Not so fast, not now. It is one thing to declare the schizo’s
private letters a documentary evidence indicative of his “morbid state of mind,” and a
completely different matter to take him up as a model for political activism, mobilizing
the body in its pure, non-moral, anti-bourgeoisie sense through which some artists
become effectively the master teachers of humanity at large [79]. There is something
so sweet, disarming, and even refreshing about Artaud’s private correspondence. The
language is pure and simple. The grammar astonishingly transparent. The vocabulary
compact and non-pedantic. The flow of the prose mind-blowing: it puts you in the
presence of a supreme state of self clarity about the modern world, even when the
discourse inaugurated by him is postmetaphysical and not technically demanding.
Artaud followed Lawrence [80, 81] and Nietzsche [19]. A schizo line of development
starts with Nietzsche and passes from Jung through Lawrence to Artaud, this is true,
but the three wrote in isolation of each others, unaware of the existence of parallel
friendly spheres of contact. Artaud’s maturity crystallized in the 1930s, immediately
after Lawrence’s death in 1930. The Artaud decade par excellence. We are back to
nature and naturalism, not through Aristotelian scholasticism, but via the door of
natural life-forms. He digs under the ancient Greeks, Roman Stoics, and non-Western
heritages, and overall he always extracts gold. Artaud had done it several times: with
Balinese theatre, with Mexican people, with the Cabala and other inherited oriental
traditions [2]. His program is cosmic and has nothing to do with an “archaeology
of knowledge.” It is a cultural excavation not in search for the past or striving to
establish points of connection with an extinguished golden age, but instead – similar
to Nietzsche’s life-long quest – Artaud aimed at revitalizing modern culture by putting
his finger on the real core of the problem: the political enslavement of artists and their
submission to the authoritarianism of bourgeoisie morality and its satellite Kantian
ethics. The methods available to him are meagre in power and comprehensiveness
but quite efficient: self observation of his diseased body and disintegrating mind on
10Ibid., our italics.
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one hand, and recording what is seen in nature outdoor. By combining cultural and
clinical empirical data, Artaud was able to study the problem of art from within the
medium of art itself. He never needed anybody’s help even when material support
was essential for keeping him alive for a while. The truth is that a schizo is a monadic
singularity reflecting the entire cosmos, a self-subsisting whole encapsulated within
superficial enclosures like the skin or the social position of the individual. Since the
artist is the productive workshop generating all types of images and molding matter
into the form of permanent, detachable structures floating in the experiential field of
nature, then in a certain sense the art world here has to adapt to the creative genius,
and not the other way around (Dilthey himself, the “serene thinker,” had already
admitted this [27].)
The process of image production undergoes a sharp sociopolitical twist when
it becomes a guarantor of the artist’s relevance to himself and also the grounding
justification for the existence of the art complex in modern culture. We need only pay
attention to the way Western theatre remains trapped within the false limits set by
the ruling elite, how the counter-attack of the Theatre of Cruelty [82] was designed to
shatter the refined sensibilities of the masses accumulated in the long-held European
traditional conception of drama as a rational means for the salvation and purification
of the spirit [83, 84] (the beautification of the soul [61].) In fact, drama understood
this way is an instrument of domination and guidance leading the exhausted working-
class crowds toward the next logical step after long weeks of toil: the intensification
of desire and the amplification of the subjective ego at the expense of a true and
authentic relationship with nature and life.
Working together, Deleuze and Guattari had developed this Lawrentian ethics
based on the groundbreaking experimentation of Artaud with his own mental state
of being, and the lessons learned from the violent rejection of the authoritarian
French society of the Artaudian artistic vision [62, 64, 74, 85]. The schizo lineage
comprising Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Lawrence, Artaud, Deleuze, and Guattari: this
is the return of art to nature and the coming into being of the natural in the
art form. In our interpretation, the key concept in this project is the Image:
Productive fields of experience and the experiential field as such playing the role
of the effective environing intellectual sphere enveloping the decisive generative act of
the individual genius. Schizophrenia is the breakthrough of nature into the human
individual expressed in and through art forms. These art forms are embodied by
free-floating images inhabiting nonpersonal, nonhuman experiential fields signifying
that ubiquitous ethico-aesthetic existential tonality expressing the presence of nature
everywhere [25]. An image never lies, for it has neither ego nor consciousness; nor
personal ideology nor rational faith.
7. Naturalism, Abstraction, and Expressionism
It is probably important now to say more about the doctrine of “naturalism” in
art or aesthetics. The position advocated in this article, the aesthetics of nature,
has nothing to do with such canonical naturalistic approach to the perception of
artworks and artistic creativity. We are not referring to the same “Nature concept”
of early nineteenth century romantic poetry and philosophy; nor do we operate with
the same semantic connections imposed by late nineteenth-, early twentieth-century
aesthetic theories. The term ‘natural’ in the philosophy of nature is not the pre-
Heideggerian banal concept of being-in-the-large (“holistic being”) that belongs to the
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Occidental metaphysics inherited from the pre-Socratic philosophers. Within both art
and mathematical physics, ‘Nature’ refers to the virtual horizon formally appropriated
– though only provisionally – under the dangerous but unavoidable technical word
‘global.’ The global emerges from the local, but the local, in turn, is constituted by
the global. Nature, in this sense, is not the sum total of entities existing outside a
“human subject” or its Hegelian version, the Absolute [86]. By deploying the term
‘nature’ in our investigations, we suffer the inevitable consequences of an inherently
imprecise approximation of the problematic of being. However, our hope for pushing
forward along this direction is only a matter of the systematic convenience of carrying
through an investigation combining art and mathematics, science and philosophy.
It is impossible at this stage to reduce nature to a “natural mode” by following the
Platonic inception of aesthetics [87, 88]. In his masterful exposition of the history of
art, Wilhelm Worringer very carefully emphasized the difference between the technical
terms ‘imitation’ and ‘naturalism’ [89]. Indeed, it has been erroneously thought – even
by philosophers – that imitating a model outside the subject is basically the same thing
as being “naturalistic.” In fact, imitation is not really part of the overall movement
in art history known as naturalism. The latter is a coherent well-articulated body
of concepts and attitudes toward the process of artistic creativity that is more far
reaching in its implications than the submission to the instinctive urge to copy a
model. Instead, Worringer introduced the dichotomy abstraction/empathy and hoped
to demonstrate, by means of a historical analysis, the fundamental irreducibility of
the one to the other.
As a matter of fact, Worringer’s formulation of the problem had theoretically
prepared for the contemporaneous event of the twentieth century’s rediscovery of
abstract art, particularly in painting. What is more important at this stage of
our analysis is the emphasis laid by the new formulation on the role played by the
psychological process of empathy in explaining the conceptual substructure underlying
naturalism. Worringer would rely on this not only to distinguish naturalism from
imitation, but also to set naturalism against abstraction. Worringer writes:
We have therefore sought to demonstrate the fact that effacement of the
fundamental diversity between mere imitation of nature and naturalism in
art is consequent upon the fallacious or one-sided interpretation placed by
posterity upon the great epochs of the Antique and the Renaissance. Of
the two artistic genera, it is naturalism alone – which did indeed reach its
zeniths in the Renaissance and the Antique – that pertains to the sphere of
pure art, and therefore naturalism alone is accessible to aesthetic evaluation.
Its psychic presupposition, as can be clearly understood, is the process of
empathy, for which the object nearest to hand is always the cognate organic,
i.e., formal processes occur within the work of art which correspond to the
natural organic tendencies in man, and permit him, in aesthetic perception,
to flow uninhibitedly with his inner feeling of vitality, with his inner need for
activity, into the felicitous current of this formal happening.11
The general thrust of Worringer’s argument is the demonstration that the foundations
of representational art, which was reaching its ultimate peak in the Antique and
Renaissance epochs, is a subjective psychic attunement to the other in nature, a
private process through which we find ourselves “in harmony with the cosmic flux of
beings out there in the natural world.” This does not only explain intellectual currents
11Worringer [89], pages 32–33.
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like the English Romantics, but, in fact, extends to all known and unknown world-
historical spiritual movements aiming at bridging the gap between man and nature.
The dualistic opposition itself between the ‘person’ and the ‘material-living whole’
(nature), to be found, for example, in religion and mysticism, is not accidental, for
naturalism as a worldview does not work without this underlying striving toward the
non-self via empathy. The love of animals and plants advocated by certain spiritual
sects can always be traced back to some sort of emphatic identification with a non-
subjective object [90], but Hegelianism just went as far as could be reached in this
regard by simply annihilating the object and the subject in the Absolute [31], or
the cosmic self-Knowing awareness of thinking as such (Hegel [86] misunderstanding
Spinoza [91]? Emerson [92] misunderstood by Nietzsche [57]?) Empathy grounds
naturalism though, metaphysically speaking, naturalism claims Being as essentially
dwelling beyond the contingent boundaries of the empirical ego. But this is simply
not true: Naturalism is an aesthetic theory that ismetaphysically false precisely for the
reason that it is grounded on an unambiguous personalistic bias toward the empathy
of the ego-pole with the non-ego (material nature) and other egos.12
But if naturalism is not imitation because the former is based on empathy (while
the latter is not), then why should naturalism fall out of consideration? Worringer
had something both old and new to say. He was out to remind his readers about the
pre-Western oriental art tradition that had not been assimilated to the transcendent
religions of Judaism and Christianity. In contrast to empathy, the urge to abstraction
is what defines the anti-naturalistic dimension of that unique and continuous non-
Western artistic experience reaching one of its peaks in Ancient Egypt:
To this concept of naturalism we contrasted the concept of style. This concept
is highly elastic in its use and meaning ... Nevertheless, we shall endeavour
to give the concept a clear interpretation derived from the facts of the case.
Since we recognize as only secondary the role played by the natural model
in the work of art, and assume an absolute artistic volition, which makes
itself the master of the external as mere objects to be made use of, as the
primary factor in the process that gives birth to art, it stands to reason
that we cannot accept the aforesaid popular interpretation of the concept of
style; since this involves, as the primary and crucial factor, the endeavour to
render the natural model ... Indeed, it is our intention, having associated the
concept of naturalism with the process of empathy, to associate the concept
of style with the other pole of the human artistic experience, namely with
the urge to abstraction.13
Although we will not adopt the terminology proposed above by associating ‘style’
with abstraction, Worringer’s basic thesis remains correct. To understand the theory
of post-naturalistic art we are advocating here, one must realize the absence in the
creative act itself of not only empathy, but also the irrelevance of all psychological
motifs in general. Dilthey, for one example, has not understood this point correctly,
even while critical of the garden-variety naturalism he found in the mainstream
materialistic aesthetic theories so popular toward the end of the nineteenth century.
12Husserl, the last great Kantian, will make the theme of empathy very prominent in his later
philosophical writings (e.g. see [93] and other unpublished manuscripts), yet while still blindly
insisting that he is “not doing psychology.” Although his use of empathy in the analysis of the genesis
of intersubjective experience [94] is interesting, in our opinion it is not fundamentally ontological and
hence remains within the parameters of the Kantian subject-based project metaphysics.
13Worringer [89], pages 33–34. Translation slightly edited.
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On the other hand, Artaud did exorcise the psychic by formulating an original program
for the aesthetics of nature completely based on bodies without organs and nonhuman
images [2, 74].
Art is not only nonrepresentational, but even its non-figurative order and act
cannot and should not be linked in a fundamental way to any internal “feeling” or
“sensations.” In his influential text Concerning the Spiritual in Art [95], Kandinsky,
one of the founders of Abstract Expressionism, attempted to facilitate the experiential
content of abstract paintings by vaguely referring us to some ‘inner necessity’ felt by
the artist while constructing his work. This term was not designed to generate mystical
connotations, but rather implies that the creator expresses his internal states of wonder
or excitement in a more direct, and hence “pure,” manner than when devising a plan
based on some objective models found in nature. In such case, abstract art, or as
Kandinsky prefers to call it, “concrete art,” becomes the most sublime form of art
because it avoids traversing any direct or indirect route eventually forcing the artist
to disclose his inner private feelings.
But we don’t know why should Abstract Expressionism be considered different
from figurative art if both are to be grounded in psychological motifs. The fact that
representational artworks operate by empathy, while abstraction (via expressionism)
does not, would then require the ontological theorem that there is a fundamental
difference between empathy and expression. But since most abstract artists (including
Kandinsky and Picasso) have not been philosophically sophisticated enough to realize
the identity of expression and empathy as variations on one and the same psychological
substrate, then the attempt to establish a fundamental divide between figurative and
non-figurative art founders at this conceptional level: There is no essential difference
between, say, abstract and literal landscapes, if the purpose is to communicate an
internal psychic image. Empathy is a motive for connecting with natural object; it
serves as the prime mover in this respect, while the expressive urge finds its ultimate
satisfaction by securing this empathetic bond on a solid formal ground, the artwork
itself.
If the expressive drive is not satiated through figurative means, then the “concrete”
treatment of the subject matter announced by Kandinsky and Abstract Expressionism
finds its resolution in the formal possibility of manipulating and controlling the
structural aspects of the material world. We are far away from imitation now, but
certainly not as far as we must be from naturalism. Abstract Expressionism is a
progressive movement in its abstract element, but had already become reactionary
by devoting its energy to the problems of “expressions” (understood psychologically.)
This applies not only to paintings, but to all art forms that can be treated by the
broad methodological approach propounded by the expressionists. True, we find post-
modernists working “abstractly,” but while conceiving their work psychologically, that
is, internally, subjectively, personalistically, etc. That does not apply to everybody,
but it is certainly the case with almost everyone in mainstream art nowadays (with few
exceptions.) The subjective expression conceived internally is a private object sealed
off from the public sphere; it comes “naturally” to the interior psychic world of the
artist, after which it realizes its exterior concrete materialization in one physical form
or another. Such process does not follow established customary rules of discourse,
like representation or figuration, but quickly erects its own authoritarian regime of
signs, laws of literacy, and rules of metaphors, collectively organizing, shaping, and
controlling the vast sum total of everything that could be formally manipulated in
the art world. Expressionism represents, then, a “purification” of High Modernism
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by which the representational Cartesian Subject finds is most natural abode in the
history of art. As in the colloquial formula ‘Marxism is capitalism gone mad,’ we find
the parallel proposition ‘expressionism is representationalism gone mad.’
So what exactly is going on here? Are not those expressionists supposed to be
the high priests of revolutionary modernism, the fearless destroyers of the naturalist
cult and its traditions and customs? The answer is not very simple, but the various
outcomes of the entire investigation carried out in this article point toward a turning
twist in the history of art. There appears to be no possible further development in
line with the previously established methods of artists working in conjunction with
a caring, maternal society. Art can no longer by consumed by the public, and it is
certainly not to be conceived with the public gaze in sight. And the discussion does not
repeat the trite cliche of “art for art’s sake,” which was rightly declaimed before as a
form of decadence. The problem facing art now is much more complex and dangerous.
While it does not yet threaten the very definition of what counts as art or not, it singles
out a mode of inquiry in philosophical aesthetics that, right from the beginning, leaves
behind all known traditional domains. Only a very thin line separates abstract, post-
Cartesian, post-naturalistic art from falling back into Cartesianism and naturalism,
and that line is drawn by the subtle inflections of expressionism as a worldview.
Although, in agreement with Worringer, abstraction has always been a force working
invisibly inside civilization, it has been recently suppressed and repressed on a massive
scale by capitalism and hence became one of its arch-enemies. Abstraction that is non-
expressionistic is something very hard to define even in Worringer’s writings, which,
as will be discussed somewhere else, remain operating with a mathematical conception
of the world that is in essence Cartesian.
8. Conclusions
The view advocated here, that of the aesthetics of nature, exemplified by the works
of Antonin Artaud and others, required that we develop a specific body of ontological
concepts suitable for a post-human, post-subjective future society. Concepts of
nonpersonal experiential fields and nonhuman images were outlined and developed
in connection with Artaud’s ontology of the process of creative art production and
the relation between art and society. The view of art within the philosophy of nature
was termed the aesthetics of nature, setting the latter against natural aesthetics.
Dilthey’s and Worringer’s writings were examined to understand the transition from
natural aesthetics to the Artaudian framework of the aesthetics of nature. The analysis
by Worringer pointed out expressionism as a philosophical movement transcending
naturalism by way of abstraction. We criticised this attitude, suggesting that
expressionism is still not far enough from idealism. The ontology of art production
sketched out briefly above aspires to new modes of artistic experience that go beyond
expressionism as such, say a non-expressionist position drawn from within a universal
philosophy of nature, such as abstract materialism, non-expressionist abstract art, and
other forms of art.
Non-expressionistic abstraction is a politico-philosophical counter-force against
the domination of all kinds of signs and coding, and certainly it is a post-metaphysical
movement in the tradition of Heidegger. Some of the artists whom we consider post-
expressionist abstract-materialists, for example, Hans Hofmann [96–98] and Jackson
Pollock [99] in abstract painting, Beckett [100] and Cormac McCarthy [101, 102] in
literature, Stan Brakhage [103, 104] and Werner Herzog [105, 106] in film, are among
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those free spirits, in the Nietzschean sense of the term, who opted for carving out
a unique direction of their own, often clashing with their societies, but while all
working from within the aesthetics of nature worldview. Although some of them
or all are not infrequently considered “expressionistic” (by the academic standards
of the term), we believe they are not part of any identifiable mainstream current.
Their work has no direct relevance to “common” problems of life and society filtered
through the established traditions of Western aesthetic theories. Yet everything
those artists perform and achieve appears to reconstruct, at a deeper philosophical
level, the complete totality of all virtual strata of the bodies and material forces
constitutive of the Real as such (which in our theory is also the Imaginary), hence
– pace Heidegger – gifting us with a supreme experiment in creative destruction and
production both practiced simultaneously at the same ontological level of experience.
The abstract machines of Deleuze and Guattari [74] are something of this sort, and
so are the nomadic machines of history [107, 108], mathematics [109–112], and some
philosophically-oriented esoteric underground religions [113].
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